Letterbox

To the Editor:

I read the article by Joshua Salwitz, on electronic voting machines, front page, Feb. 2007, and noted several parts that I believe are in error. They include:

Page 1, paragraph 3, under “Controversial Portion of Help America Vote Act,” the writer states “ ... which requires states to modernize and computerize the voting process.” But there were other alternatives allowed, basically any method that permitted disabled voters (especially blind ones) to vote unassisted.

Page 12, paragraph 1, includes the sentence, “It should be noted that the system only records the vote count from each of the ballots and not the actual vote itself.” False. This article only considers polling-place voting, and totally misses the way Whatcom County votes, all by mail. Our system records every vote (and errors, too) on every ballot, and it archives the set of votes in a computerized record (essentially, a database.)

Page 12, paragraph 2, describes a process, “Once the polling center has been closed, a special ballot is run through the machine … .” Maybe in some systems in other places, but not in Whatcom County. Our ballots are processed centrally, over a period of time starting on election day, even before the polls are closed. Each batch of ballots is processed by one of three machines, and the operator indicates the termination of a batch.

And in the same paragraph “... the memory card from each system is sent to a central location ... .” Again, that is not the Whatcom County system. Our three scanners are local-networked to the central tabulator machine (and its backup). There are no memory cards in that step. (For clarity, our network is not connected to any other network — the final results are carried by sneaker-net on a thumb-drive to another computer connected to the general county system and the Internet.)

Page 12, paragraph 4, says that the DRE “… stores the vote information on the memory card … .” That’s incomplete. In the systems I am familiar with, the votes are stored on the computer, then transferred to the memory card when the voting has been completed.

Page 12, paragraph 5, says that “If the numbers from the precinct printout match the count by the central tabulator, the results are certified and deemed official.” That is grossly oversimplified; there are many more steps in that process.

Page 12, paragraph 7, (under “Benefits of Both Systems”), notes that “... benefits that are realized by the state election departments ... .” The state does not “use” these systems, only the counties do.

Page 12, paragraph 7, (under “Benefits of Both Systems”), alleges “... a lower total cost of ownership ... .” That’s almost always false. Jurisdictions are finding increased costs, especially for storage, maintenance and obligatory software upgrades. Also, the writer did not identify what alternate system was being compared, a basic process error.

Page 12, paragraph 7, (under “Benefits of Both Systems”), DREs, “... being easier to manage than paper systems … .” Controversial. Much more has to be looked at to determine this, not just DRE vs. paper.

Page 12, in the sidebar, it is stated that “Over 51 percent of Sequoia’s electronic voting systems used a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) — a widely recognized important safety feature that ensures the reliability and auditability of the systems.” ((Editor’s Note: This is a claim on the Sequoia Web site, not a claim by Joshua Salwitz, who didn’t write the sidebar.)

Some of the VVPAT equipment itself is unreliable in many different ways. And even if the papers produced by the machine are right, simply having them is not sufficient — additional processes to use those papers must be taken, before achieving auditability (and the implied voter confidence in the system).

http://NoLeakyBuckets.org